Public Finance and Public Policy (International Edition)
Höfundur: Gruber, Jonathan
10.790 kr.
Lýsing:
The enormous scale of the COVID-19 crisis has launched new debates over investment in unemployment insurance and infrastructure, rising national debt, and more. Who better than Jonathan Gruber to guide students through the particulars? In the new edition of his best-selling text, Gruber covers the fundamentals of public finance with an emphasis on responses to Covid-19, highlighting the variety of decisions that the government had to make and the controversies they engendered.
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- Höfundur: Gruber, Jonathan
- Útgáfa:7
- Útgáfudagur: 12/15/2021
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- Format:ePub
- ISBN 13: 9781319466947
- Print ISBN: 9781319466923
- ISBN 10: 131946694X
Efnisyfirlit
- About this Book
- Cover Page
- Half Title Page
- Title Page
- Copyright Page
- Dedication
- About the Authors
- Brief Contents
- Contents
- From the Author
- What’s New in this Edition
- Presentation and Pedagogy
- Instructor Resources
- Acknowledgments
- Accessibility
- Chapter 1: Why Study Public Finance?
- 1.1 The Four Questions of Public Finance
- When Should the Government Intervene in the Economy?
- How Might the Government Intervene?
- What Is the Effect of Those Interventions on Economic Outcomes?
- Why Do Governments Choose to Intervene in the Way That They Do?
- 1.2 Why Study Public Finance? Facts on Government in the United States and Around the World
- The Size and Growth of Government
- Decentralization
- Spending, Taxes, Deficits, and Debts
- Distribution of Spending
- Distribution of Spending
- Regulatory Role of the Government
- 1.3 The Questions of Public Finance Are Front and Center During Covid-19
- When Should the Government Intervene?
- How Should the Government Intervene?
- What Are the Effects of Interventions?
- Why Governments Do What They Do
- 1.4 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 1.1 The Four Questions of Public Finance
- 2.1 Constrained Utility Maximization
- Preferences and Indifference Curves
- Utility Mapping of Preferences
- Budget Constraints
- Putting It All Together: Constrained Choice
- The Effects of Price Changes: Substitution and Income Effects
- 2.2 Putting the Tools to Work: TANF and Labor Supply Among Single Parents
- Identifying the Budget Constraint
- The Effect of TANF on the Budget Constraint
- 2.3 Equilibrium and Social Welfare
- Demand Curves
- Supply Curves
- Equilibrium
- Social Efficiency
- Competitive Equilibrium Maximizes Social Efficiency
- From Social Efficiency to Social Welfare: The Role of Equity
- Choosing an Equity Criterion
- 2.4 Welfare Implications of Benefit Reductions: The TANF Example Continued
- 2.5 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 3.1 The Important Distinction Between Correlation and Causality
- The Problem
- 3.2 Measuring Causation with Data We’d Like to Have: Randomized Trials
- Randomized Trials as a Solution
- The Problem of Bias
- Randomized Trials of ERT
- Randomized Trials in the TANF Context
- Why We Need to Go Beyond Randomized Trials
- 3.3 Estimating Causation with Data We Actually Get: Observational Data
- Time Series Analysis
- Cross-Sectional Regression Analysis
- Quasi-Experiments
- Structural Modeling
- 3.4 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 4.1 Government Budgeting
- The Budget Deficit in Recent Years
- The Budget Process
- State and International Deficit Rules
- 4.2 Measuring the Budgetary Position of the Government: Alternative Approaches
- Real Versus Nominal
- Economic Conditions
- Cash Versus Capital Accounting
- Static Versus Dynamic Scoring
- 4.3 Do Current Debts and Deficits Mean Anything? A Long-Run Perspective
- Background: Present Discounted Value
- Why Current Labels May Be Meaningless
- Measuring Long-Run Government Budgets
- What Does the U.S. Government Do?
- 4.4 Why Do We Care About the Government’s Fiscal Position?
- Short-Run Versus Long-Run Effects of the Government on the Macroeconomy
- Background: Savings and Economic Growth
- The Federal Budget, Interest Rates, and Economic Growth
- 4.5 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 5.1 Externality Theory
- Economics of Negative Production Externalities
- Negative Consumption Externalities
- Positive Externalities
- 5.2 Private-Sector Solutions to Negative Externalities
- The Solution
- The Problems with Coasian Solutions
- 5.3 Public-Sector Remedies for Externalities
- Corrective Taxation
- Subsidies
- Regulation
- 5.4 Distinctions Between Price and Quantity Approaches to Addressing Externalities
- Basic Model
- Price Regulation (Taxes) Versus Quantity Regulation in This Model
- Multiple Plants with Different Reduction Costs
- Uncertainty About Costs of Reduction
- 5.5 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 6.1 The Role of Economics in Environmental Regulation: The Case of Particulates
- History of Particulate Regulation
- Has the CAA Been a Success?
- 6.2 Climate Change
- The Kyoto Treaty
- Can Trading Make Environmental Agreements More Cost-Effective?
- The Paris Agreement and the Future
- 6.3 The Economics of Cigarette Smoking
- The Externalities of Cigarette Smoking
- 6.4 The Economics of Other Externality-Creating Behaviors
- Alcohol Use
- Illicit Drugs
- Summary
- 6.5 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 7.1 Optimal Provision of Public Goods
- Optimal Provision of Private Goods
- Optimal Provision of Public Goods
- 7.2 Private Provision of Public Goods
- Private-Sector Underprovision
- Can Private Providers Overcome the Free Rider Problem?
- When Is Private Provision Likely to Overcome the Free Rider Problem?
- 7.3 Public Provision of Public Goods
- The Right Mix of Public and Private
- Measuring the Costs and Benefits of Public Goods
- How Can We Measure Preferences for Public Goods?
- 7.4 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 8.1 Measuring the Costs of Public Projects
- The Example
- Measuring Current Costs
- 8.2 Measuring the Benefits of Public Projects
- Valuing Driving Time Saved
- Valuing Saved Lives
- Discounting Future Benefits
- Cost-Effectiveness Analysis
- 8.3 Putting It All Together
- Other Issues in Cost-Benefit Analysis
- 8.4 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 9.1 Unanimous Consent on Public Goods Levels
- Lindahl Pricing
- Problems with Lindahl Pricing
- 9.2 Mechanisms for Aggregating Individual Preferences
- Majority Voting: When It Works
- Majority Voting: When It Doesn’t Work
- Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem
- Restricting Preferences to Solve the Impossibility Problem
- Median Voter Theory
- The Potential Inefficiency of the Median Voter Outcome
- Summary
- 9.3 Representative Democracy
- Vote-Maximizing Politicians Represent the Median Voter
- Assumptions of the Median Voter Model
- Lobbying
- Evidence on the Median Voter Model for Representative Democracy
- Increasing Polarization in American Politics
- 9.4 Public Choice Theory: The Foundations of Government Failure
- Size-Maximizing Bureaucracy
- Leviathan Theory
- Corruption
- The Implications of Government Failure
- 9.5 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 10.1 Fiscal Federalism in the United States and Abroad
- Spending and Revenue of State and Local Governments
- Fiscal Federalism Abroad
- 10.2 Optimal Fiscal Federalism
- The Tiebout Hypothesis
- Problems with the Tiebout Model
- Evidence on the Tiebout Model
- Optimal Fiscal Federalism
- 10.3 Redistribution Across Communities
- Should We Care?
- Tools of Redistribution: Grants
- Redistribution in Action: School Finance Equalization
- 10.4 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 11.1 Why Should the Government Be Involved in Education?
- Productivity
- Citizenship
- Credit Market Failures
- Failure to Maximize Family Utility
- Redistribution
- 11.2 How Is the Government Involved in Education?
- Free Public Education and Crowding Out
- Solving the Crowd-Out Problem: Vouchers
- Problems with Educational Vouchers
- 11.3 Evidence on Competition in Education Markets
- Direct Experience with Vouchers
- Experience with Public School Choice
- Experience with Public School Incentives
- Bottom Line on Vouchers and School Choice
- 11.4 Measuring the Returns to Education
- Effects of Education Levels on Productivity
- Effects of Education Levels on Other Outcomes
- The Impact of School Quality
- 11.5 The Role of the Government in Higher Education
- Current Government Role
- What Is the Market Failure, and How Should It Be Addressed?
- 11.6 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 12.1 What Is Insurance and Why Do Individuals Value It?
- What Is Insurance?
- Why Do Individuals Value Insurance?
- Formalizing This Intuition: Expected Utility Model
- 12.2 Why Have Social Insurance? Asymmetric Information and Adverse Selection
- Asymmetric Information
- Example with Perfect Information
- Example with Asymmetric Information
- The Problem of Adverse Selection
- Does Asymmetric Information Necessarily Lead to Market Failure?
- How Does the Government Address Adverse Selection?
- 12.3 Other Reasons for Government Intervention in Insurance Markets
- Externalities
- Administrative Costs
- Redistribution
- Paternalism
- 12.4 Social Insurance Versus Self-Insurance: How Much Consumption Smoothing?
- Example: Unemployment Insurance
- Lessons for Consumption-Smoothing Role of Social Insurance
- 12.5 The Problem with Insurance: Moral Hazard
- What Determines Moral Hazard?
- Moral Hazard Is Multidimensional
- The Consequences of Moral Hazard
- 12.6 Putting It All Together: Optimal Social Insurance
- 12.7 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 13.1 What Is Social Security, and How Does It Work?
- Program Details
- How Does Social Security Work over Time?
- How Does Social Security Redistribute in Practice?
- 13.2 Consumption-Smoothing Benefits of Social Security
- Rationales for Social Security
- Does Social Security Smooth Consumption?
- 13.3 Social Security and Retirement
- Theory
- Evidence
- Implications
- 13.4 Social Security Reform
- Reform First Steps: The Greenspan Commission
- Potential Next Steps: Incremental Reforms
- Fundamental Reform: Privatization
- 13.5 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 14.1 Institutional Features of Unemployment Insurance, Disability Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation
- Institutional Features of Unemployment Insurance
- Institutional Features of Disability Insurance
- Institutional Features of Workers’ Compensation
- Comparison of the Features of UI, DI, and WC
- 14.2 Consumption-Smoothing Benefits of Social Insurance Programs
- 14.3 Moral Hazard Effects of Social Insurance Programs
- Moral Hazard Effects of Unemployment Insurance
- Evidence for Moral Hazard in DI
- Evidence for Moral Hazard in WC
- 14.4 The Costs and Benefits of Social Insurance to Firms
- The Effects of Partial Experience Rating in UI on Layoffs
- The “Benefits” of Partial Experience Rating
- Workers’ Compensation and Firms
- 14.5 Implications for Program Reform
- Benefits Generosity
- Targeting
- Worker Self-Insurance?
- 14.6 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 15.1 An Overview of Health Care in the United States
- How Health Insurance Works: The Basics
- Private Insurance
- Medicare
- Medicaid
- TRICARE/CHAMPVA
- The Uninsured
- 15.2 How Generous Should Insurance Be to Patients?
- Consumption-Smoothing Benefits of Health Insurance for Patients
- Moral Hazard Costs of Health Insurance for Patients
- How Elastic Is the Demand for Medical Care? The RAND Health Insurance Experiment
- Optimal Health Insurance
- 15.3 How Generous Should Insurance Be to Medical Providers?
- Managed Care and Prospective Reimbursement
- The Impacts of Managed Care
- How Should Providers Be Reimbursed?
- 15.4 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 16.1 The Medicaid Program for Low-Income Families
- How Medicaid Works
- Who Is Eligible for Medicaid?
- What Health Services Does Medicaid Cover?
- How Do Providers Get Paid?
- 16.2 What Are the Benefits of the Medicaid Program?
- Does Medicaid Provide Financial Protection?
- Does Medicaid Improve Health?
- How Does Medicaid Affect Health? Evidence
- 16.3 The Medicare Program
- How Medicare Works
- 16.4 Controlling Costs in the Medicare Program
- The Prospective Payment System
- Problems with PPS
- Lesson: The Difficulty of Partial Reform
- Medicare Managed Care
- Should Medicare Move to a Full-Choice Plan? Premium Support
- Gaps in Medicare Coverage
- 16.5 Long-Term Care
- Financing Long-Term Care
- 16.6 Health Care Reform and the ACA
- The Historical Impasse
- The Massachusetts Experiment with Incremental Universalism
- The Affordable Care Act
- Early Evidence on the Effects of the ACA
- The ACA Runs into Trouble
- What Does the Future Hold?
- 16.7 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 17.1 Facts on Income Distribution in the United States
- Relative Income Inequality
- Absolute Deprivation and Poverty Rates
- What Matters—Relative or Absolute Deprivation?
- 17.2 Transfer Policy in the United States
- Cash Transfer Programs
- In-Kind Programs
- 17.3 The Moral Hazard Costs of Transfer Policy
- Moral Hazard Effects of a Means-Tested Transfer System
- Solving Moral Hazard by Lowering the Benefit Reduction Rate
- The “Iron Triangle” of Redistributive Programs
- 17.4 Reducing the Moral Hazard of Transfers
- Moving to Categorical Transfer Payments
- Using In-Kind Benefits
- Increasing Outside Options
- 17.5 Universal Basic Income?
- 17.6 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 18.1 Types of Taxation
- Taxes on Earnings
- Taxes on Individual Income
- Taxes on Corporate Income
- Taxes on Wealth
- Taxes on Consumption
- Taxation Around the World
- 18.2 Structure of the Individual Income Tax in the United States
- Computing the Tax Base
- Tax Rates and Taxes Paid
- 18.3 Measuring the Fairness of Tax Systems
- Average and Marginal Tax Rates
- Vertical and Horizontal Equity
- Measuring Vertical Equity
- 18.4 Defining the Income Tax Base
- The Haig-Simons Comprehensive Income Definition
- Deviations Due to Ability-to-Pay Considerations
- Deviations Due to Costs of Earning Income
- 18.5 Externality/Public Goods Rationales for Deviating from Haig-Simons
- Charitable Giving
- Spending Crowd-Out Versus Tax Subsidy Crowd-In
- Consumer Sovereignty Versus Imperfect Information
- Housing
- Tax Deductions Versus Tax Credits
- Bottom Line: Tax Expenditures
- 18.6 The Appropriate Unit of Taxation
- The Problem of the “Marriage Tax”
- Marriage Taxes in Practice
- 18.7 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 19.1 The Three Rules of Tax Incidence
- Rule 1: The Statutory Burden of a Tax Does Not Describe Who Really Bears the Tax
- Rule 2: The Side of the Market on Which the Tax Is Imposed Is Irrelevant to the Distribution of the Tax Burdens
- Rule 3: Parties with Inelastic Supply or Demand Bear Taxes; Parties with Elastic Supply or Demand Avoid Them
- Reminder: Tax Incidence Is About Prices, Not Quantities
- Reminder: Balanced Budget Tax Incidence
- 19.2 Example: Tax Incidence in Factor Markets
- 19.3 General Equilibrium Tax Incidence
- Effects of a Restaurant Tax: A General Equilibrium Example
- Issues to Consider in General Equilibrium Incidence Analysis
- 19.4 The Incidence of Taxation in the United States
- TPC Incidence Assumptions
- Results of TPC Incidence Analysis
- Current Versus Lifetime Income Incidence
- 19.5 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 20.1 Taxation and Economic Efficiency
- Graphical Approach
- Elasticities Determine Tax Inefficiency
- Determinants of Deadweight Loss
- Deadweight Loss and the Design of Efficient Tax Systems
- 20.2 Optimal Commodity Taxation
- Ramsey Taxation: The Theory of Optimal Commodity Taxation
- Inverse Elasticity Rule
- Equity Implications of the Ramsey Model
- 20.3 Optimal Income Taxes
- A Simple Example
- General Model with Behavioral Effects
- An Example
- 20.4 Tax-Benefit Linkages and the Financing of Social Insurance Programs
- The Model
- Issues Raised by Tax-Benefit Linkage Analysis
- 20.5 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 21.1 Taxation and Labor Supply—Theory
- Basic Theory
- Limitations of the Theory: Constraints on Hours Worked and Overtime Pay Rules
- 21.2 Taxation and Labor Supply—Evidence
- Limitations of Existing Studies
- 21.3 Tax Policy to Promote Labor Supply: The Earned Income Tax Credit
- Background on the EITC
- Impact of EITC on Labor Supply: Theory
- Impact of EITC on Labor Supply: Evidence14
- Summary of the Evidence
- 21.4 The Tax Treatment of Child Care and Its Impact on Labor Supply
- The Tax Treatment of Child Care
- Options for Resolving Tax Wedges
- Comparing the Options
- 21.5 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 22.1 Taxation and Savings—Theory and Evidence
- Traditional Theory
- Evidence: How Does the After-Tax Interest Rate Affect Savings?
- Inflation and the Taxation of Savings
- 22.2 Alternative Models of Savings
- Precautionary Savings Models
- Self-Control Models
- 22.3 Tax Incentives for Retirement Savings
- Available Tax Subsidies for Retirement Savings
- Theoretical Effects of Tax-Subsidized Retirement Savings
- Implications of Alternative Models
- Private Versus National Savings
- Evidence on Tax Incentives and Savings
- 22.4 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 23.1 Taxation and Risk Taking
- Basic Financial Investment Model
- Real-World Complications
- Evidence on Taxation and Risk Taking
- Labor Investment Applications
- 23.2 Capital Gains Taxation
- Current Tax Treatment of Capital Gains
- What Are the Arguments for Tax Preferences for Capital Gains?
- What Are the Arguments Against Tax Preferences for Capital Gains?
- 23.3 Transfer Taxation
- Why Tax Wealth? Arguments for the Estate Tax
- Arguments Against the Estate Tax
- 23.4 Property Taxation
- Who Bears the Property Tax?
- Types of Property Taxation
- 23.5 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- 24.1 What Are Corporations, and Why Do We Tax Them?
- Ownership Versus Control
- Firm Financing
- Why Do We Have a Corporate Tax?
- 24.2 The Structure of the Corporate Tax
- Revenues
- Expenses
- Corporate Tax Rate
- Tax Credits
- 24.3 The Incidence of the Corporate Tax
- 24.4 The Consequences of the Corporate Tax for Investment
- Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Tax and Investment Decisions
- Negative Effective Tax Rates
- Policy Implications of the Impact of the Corporate Tax on Investment
- 24.5 Treatment of International Corporate Income
- How to Tax International Income
- Global Versus Territorial Taxation
- 24.6 The Consequences of the Corporate Tax for Financing
- The Impact of Taxes on Financing
- Why Not All Debt?
- The Dividend Paradox
- How Should Dividends Be Taxed?
- Corporate Tax Integration
- 24.7 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Problems
- 25.1 Why Fundamental Tax Reform?
- Improving Tax Compliance
- Making the Tax Code Simpler
- Improving Tax Efficiency
- Summary: The Benefits of Fundamental Tax Reform
- 25.2 The Politics and Economics of Tax Reform
- Political Pressures for a Complicated Tax Code
- Economic Pressures Against Broadening the Tax Base
- The Conundrum
- 25.3 Consumption Taxation
- Why Might Consumption Make a Better Tax Base?
- Why Might Consumption Be a Worse Tax Base?
- Designing a Consumption Tax
- Backing into Consumption Taxation: Cash-Flow Taxation
- 25.4 The Flat Tax
- Advantages of a Flat Tax
- Problems with the Flat Tax
- 25.5 Conclusion
- End of Chapter
- Highlights
- Questions and Problems
- Advanced Questions
- FIGURE 1-1 Federal Government Spending.
- FIGURE 1-2 Total Government Spending.
- FIGURE 1-3 Federal versus State or Local Government Spending.
- FIGURE 1-4 Federal Revenues and Expenditures.
- FIGURE 1-5 Debt Levels of O E C D Nations.
- FIGURE 1-6 State and Local Government Receipts, Expenditures, and Surplus.
- FIGURE 1-7 Distribution of Federal and State Expenditures.
- FIGURE 1-8 Distribution of Federal and State Expenditures.
- FIGURE 2-1 Indifference Curves.
- FIGURE 2-2 Indifference Curve Analysis.
- FIGURE 2-3 Diminishing Marginal Utility.
- FIGURE 2-4 Marginal Rates of Substitution.
- FIGURE 2-5 Budget Constraint.
- FIGURE 2-6 Constrained Optimization.
- FIGURE 2-7 Substitution and Income Effects.
- FIGURE 2-8 The Consumption–Leisure Trade-off.
- FIGURE 2-9 Budget Constraint.
- FIGURE 2-10 Utility Maximization.
- FIGURE 2-11 Utility Maximization.
- FIGURE 2-12 Deriving the Demand Curve.
- FIGURE 2-13 Market Outcome.
- FIGURE 2-14 Consumer Surplus.
- FIGURE 2-15 Producer Surplus.
- FIGURE 2-16 Competitive Equilibrium.
- FIGURE 2-17 Welfare Implications.
- FIGURE 3-1 Average Benefit Guarantee.
- FIGURE 3-2 Real Cigarette Prices and Youth Smoking.
- FIGURE 3-3 T A N F Benefits and Labor Supply.
- FIGURE 3-4 T A N F Benefit Income and Labor Supply.
- FIGURE 4-1 Federal Taxes, Spending, and the Deficit.
- FIGURE 4-2 Economic Adjustment.
- FIGURE 4-3 Projected Versus Actual Surplus or Deficit.
- FIGURE 4-4 Capital Market Equilibrium.
- FIGURE 4-5 Worldwide Decline in Real Interest rates.
- FIGURE 5-1 Average Global Temperature.
- FIGURE 5-2 Market Failure due to Negative Production Externalities.
- FIGURE 5-3 Market Failure due to Negative Consumption Externalities.
- FIGURE 5-4 Market Failure due to Positive Production Externality.
- FIGURE 5-5 A Coasian Solution to Negative Production Externalities.
- FIGURE 5-6 Taxation as a Solution to Negative Production Externalities.
- FIGURE 5-7 Subsidies as a Solution to Positive Production Externalities.
- FIGURE 5-8 Market for Pollution Reduction.
- FIGURE 5-9 Pollution Reduction with Multiple Firms.
- FIGURE 5-10 Market for Pollution Reduction.
- FIGURE 6-1 Emissions in Counties
- FIGURE 6-2 Top 25 Fossil Fuel Emitters.
- FIGURE 6-3 Benefits of Trading.
- FIGURE 6-4 U.S. Adults Who Smoke Cigarettes.
- FIGURE 6-5 Changes in Drinking and Mortality
- FIGURE 6-6 Changes in Drinking and Mortality Around Age 21
- FIGURE 7-1 Horizontal Summation.
- FIGURE 7-2 Vertical Summation.
- FIGURE 9-1 Lindahl Pricing.
- TABLE 9-1: Majority voting delivers a consistent outcome.
- Table 9-2: Majority voting doesn’t deliver a consistent outcome.
- FIGURE 9-2 Single-Peaked Versus Non-Single-Peaked Preferences.
- FIGURE 9-3 Vote Maximization.
- FIGURE 9-4 Political Polarization.
- The U S Congress.
- FIGURE 10-1 Changing Fiscal Federalism.
- TABLE 10-1 Comparison of State Spending and Revenue.
- FIGURE 10-2 Education and Private Goods.
- FIGURE 10-3 Impact of a Matching Grant.
- FIGURE 10-4 Impact of an Unconditional Block Grant.
- FIGURE 10-5 Impact of a Conditional Block Grant.
- FIGURE 11-1 Education Spending and Outcomes.
- FIGURE 11-2 Education Spending.
- FIGURE 11-3 Public School Crowd-Out.
- FIGURE 11-4 Government Spending on Higher Education.
- FIGURE 12-1 Government Spending by Function.
- FIGURE 13-1 Social Security Benefits.
- FIGURE 13-2 Elderly poverty and social security.
- FIGURE 13-3 Elderly work and social security.
- FIGURE 13-4 Hazard rate of retirement.
- FIGURE 13-5 Implicit taxes.
- FIGURE 13-6 Ratio of Older Adults to Working-Age Population.
- FIGURE 14-1 Unemployment Benefit Schedule.
- FIGURE 14-2 Duration of U I Benefits.
- FIGURE 14-3 Effect of UI Benefits.
- FIGURE 14-4 Labor force Nonparticipation.
- FIGURE 14-5 D I Benefit Amount.
- FIGURE 14-6 Earnings by age.
- FIGURE 14-7 W C Benefit changes and Injury duration.
- FIGURE 14-8 Experience-Rating Schedule.
- FIGURE 14-9 Unemployment Insurance.
- FIGURE 15-1 Health Care Spending in O E C D Nations.
- FIGURE 15-2 Distribution of National Health Expenditures.
- FIGURE 15-3 Health System Outcomes.
- FIGURE 15-4 Breakdown of Health Care Overspending.
- FIGURE 15-5 Cost of Medical Procedures and Drugs.
- FIGURE 15-6 Cost of Medical Services.
- FIGURE 15-7 Patient-Side Moral Hazard.
- FIGURE 15-8 The flat of the curve.
- FIGURE 15-9 Age Profiles for Outpatient Visits and Inpatient Admissions.
- FIGURE 15-10 Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance.
- FIGURE 16-1 Medicaid.
- FIGURE 16-2 Timing of Hospital Discharges.
- FIGURE 16-3 Medicare beneficiaries.
- FIGURE 16-4 Incorporating H M Os into Medicare
- FIGURE 16-5 Uninsurance for Adults.
- FIGURE 16-6 Decrease in Mortality.
- FIGURE 17-1 Life Expectancies.
- FIGURE 17-2 Aggregate Income.
- FIGURE 17-3 Poverty Rates.
- FIGURE 17-4 Labour Supply Decisions.
- FIGURE 17-5 Labour Supply Decisions.
- FIGURE 17-6 Transfer Benefits and Single Motherhood.
- FIGURE 17-7 Distribution of Formal Care Consumption.
- FIGURE 17-8 Cash Transfer Opportunity Set.
- FIGURE 17-9 Tying Health Insurance to Cash Transfers.
- FIGURE 17-10 Transfer Caseloads.
- FIGURE 17-11 Average Annual Income Growth.
- FIGURE 17-12 Employment Impacts.
- FIGURE 18-1 Government Revenue
- FIGURE 18-2 International Tax Revenues.
- FIGURE 18-3 Federal Income Tax Rate Schedule.
- FIGURE 19-1 Sources of Federal Revenue.
- FIGURE 19-2 Statutory Burdens.
- FIGURE 19-3 Side of the Market.
- FIGURE 19-4 Inelastic Factors.
- FIGURE 19-5 Elastic Factors.
- FIGURE 19-6 Elasticity of Supply.
- FIGURE 19-7 Incidence Analysis.
- FIGURE 19-9 Tax on Bozeman Restaurants.
- FIGURE 19-9 Tax on Bozeman Restaurants.
- FIGURE 19-10 Bozeman Restaurant Tax on Labor Versus Capital.
- FIGURE 20-1 Deadweight Loss of a Tax.
- FIGURE 20-2 Deadweight Loss.
- FIGURE 20-3 Effects of the Window Tax.
- FIGURE 20-4 Effects of the Window Tax.
- FIGURE 20-5 Marginal Deadweight Loss.
- FIGURE 20-6 Preexisting Distortions.
- FIGURE 20-7 Low Rates Imposed on a Broad Base.
- FIGURE 20-8 Consequences of Subsidies and Taxes.
- FIGURE 20-9 The Laffer Curve.
- FIGURE 20-10 Optimal Income Taxation.
- FIGURE 20-11 Tax-Benefit Linkages.
- FIGURE 20-12 Taxation with No Deadweight Loss.
- FIGURE 21-1 Taxation and the Consumption-Leisure Trade-Off.
- FIGURE 21-2 Substitution Versus Income Effect.
- FIGURE 21-3 Distribution of Incomes.
- FIGURE 21-4 Earned Income Tax Credit.
- FIGURE 21-5 Earned Income Tax Credit.
- FIGURE 21-6 E I T C’s Effect on Labor Supply.
- FIGURE 21-7 Changes in the E I T C Structure.
- FIGURE 22-1 Taxation and the Intertemporal Consumption Decision.
- FIGURE 22-2 Intertemporal Substitution Versus Income Effect.
- FIGURE 22-3 Tax Subsidies and the Intertemporal Consumption Trade-Off.
- FIGURE 22-4 I R A's and the Intertemporal Consumption Decision.
- FIGURE 22-5 Low Savers Versus High Savers.
- FIGURE 22-6 Individual Contributions Above and Below Top Tax Cutoff.
- FIGURE 23-1 Capital Gains Tax Rates and Capital Gains Realizations.
- FIGURE 23-2 Measuring the Response of Capital Gains Realizations to Tax Cuts
- FIGURE 24-1 Sources of Corporate Finance.
- FIGURE 24-2 Investment Decisions with No Corporate Tax.
- FIGURE 24-3 Investment Decision with a Tax on Corporate Income .
- FIGURE 24-4 Investment Decisions with Depreciation and the I T C.
- FIGURE 24-5 The Firm’s Financing Decision.
- FIGURE 25-1 Optimal Tax Evasion.
- FIGURE 25-2 Number of Pages in Individual Tax Return Documents.
- FIGURE 25-3 Optimal Tax Evasion
- FIGURE 25-4 Changes in the Tax Base.
- FIGURE 25-5 Consumption Taxation in OECD Nations.
- Back Cover.
UM RAFBÆKUR Á HEIMKAUP.IS
Bókahillan þín er þitt svæði og þar eru bækurnar þínar geymdar. Þú kemst í bókahilluna þína hvar og hvenær sem er í tölvu eða snjalltæki. Einfalt og þægilegt!Rafbók til eignar
Rafbók til eignar þarf að hlaða niður á þau tæki sem þú vilt nota innan eins árs frá því bókin er keypt.
Þú kemst í bækurnar hvar sem er
Þú getur nálgast allar raf(skóla)bækurnar þínar á einu augabragði, hvar og hvenær sem er í bókahillunni þinni. Engin taska, enginn kyndill og ekkert vesen (hvað þá yfirvigt).
Auðvelt að fletta og leita
Þú getur flakkað milli síðna og kafla eins og þér hentar best og farið beint í ákveðna kafla úr efnisyfirlitinu. Í leitinni finnur þú orð, kafla eða síður í einum smelli.
Glósur og yfirstrikanir
Þú getur auðkennt textabrot með mismunandi litum og skrifað glósur að vild í rafbókina. Þú getur jafnvel séð glósur og yfirstrikanir hjá bekkjarsystkinum og kennara ef þeir leyfa það. Allt á einum stað.
Hvað viltu sjá? / Þú ræður hvernig síðan lítur út
Þú lagar síðuna að þínum þörfum. Stækkaðu eða minnkaðu myndir og texta með multi-level zoom til að sjá síðuna eins og þér hentar best í þínu námi.
Fleiri góðir kostir
- Þú getur prentað síður úr bókinni (innan þeirra marka sem útgefandinn setur)
- Möguleiki á tengingu við annað stafrænt og gagnvirkt efni, svo sem myndbönd eða spurningar úr efninu
- Auðvelt að afrita og líma efni/texta fyrir t.d. heimaverkefni eða ritgerðir
- Styður tækni sem hjálpar nemendum með sjón- eða heyrnarskerðingu
- Gerð : 208
- Höfundur : 16868
- Útgáfuár : 2019
- Leyfi : 379
