Jones & Sufrin's EU Competition Law
Lýsing:The complete guide to EU competition law, combining key primary sources with expert author...
5.690 kr.
Lýsing:
The complete guide to EU competition law, combining key primary sources with expert author commentary. The most comprehensive resource for students on EU competition law; extracts from key cases, academic works, and legislation are paired with incisive critique and commentary from an expert author team Selling Points— • Full, definitive coverage of every aspect of EU competition law - the complete guide to the subject • Students are guided through the most important extracts from key cases, articles, and statutory material, all carefully selected and explained by this experienced author team • 'Central Issues' at the start of each chapter clearly identify key themes and principles discussed, to help readers navigate the material effectively • Extensive footnoting and further reading suggestions provide a thorough guide to the literature, giving students a starting point for their own research and reading New to this edition— • Full analysis of important developments in competition law and policy since 2019, including relevant case-law, new EU legislation and notices and competition law goals; • A comprehensive discussion of the evolving law and policy governing market definition and vertical, horizontal cooperation and sustainability agreements; • A new chapter on competition law in the digital economy, incorporating a discussion of the Digital Markets Act.
Annað
- Höfundar: Alison Jones, Brenda Sufrin, Niamh Dunne
- Útgáfa:8
- Útgáfudagur: 2023-08-24
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- Format:ePub
- ISBN 13: 9780192667069
- Print ISBN: 9780192855015
- ISBN 10: 0192667068
Efnisyfirlit
- Cover
- Title Page
- Copyright page
- Preface
- Acknowledgements
- Table of Contents
- Table of European Cases
- Commission Decisions
- General Court (Alphabetical Table)
- General Court (Numerical Table)
- Court of Justice (Alphabetical Table)
- Court of Justice (Numerical Table)
- European Court of Human Rights
- EFTA Court
- National Courts of the Member States (including UK cases before 2021)
- Denmark
- France
- Germany
- Italy
- Netherlands
- Spain
- Sweden
- United Kingdom (before 2021)
- International Courts
- National Courts of Non-EU States
- Australia
- United Kingdom (2021 onwards)
- United States
- European Secondary Legislation
- Regulations
- Directives
- Decisions
- Notices Etc.
- Opinions
- Recommendations
- United Kingdom Legislation
- Statutes
- Statutory Instruments
- Foreign Legislation
- Australia
- Canada
- China
- Germany
- Ireland
- South Africa
- United States
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- A. General
- B. Climate Change and Sustainability
- (i) General
- (ii) The European Green Deal
- (iii) Competition Law, Climate Change, and Sustainability
- A. Basic Concepts
- (i) Demand Curves and Consumer and Producer Surplus
- (ii) Elasticity of Demand (Own Price Elasticity)
- (iii) Cross-elasticity of Demand
- (iv) Profit Maximisation
- (v) Economies of Scale and Scope
- (vi) Externalities
- B. Perfect Competition and Efficiency
- (i) Perfect Competition
- (ii) Allocative Efficiency
- (iii) Productive Efficiency
- (iv) Dynamic Efficiency
- C. Monopoly
- D. Oligopoly
- E. ‘Imperfect’ or ‘Monopolistic’ Competition
- F. The Concept of Welfare: Total (Social) Welfare, Consumer Welfare, and Efficiency
- G. Dynamic Competition and Schumpeterian Rivalry
- A. Harvard, Chicago, and Post Chicago
- (i) Introduction
- (ii) The Harvard School
- (iii) The Chicago School
- (iv) Post-Chicago
- (v) Conclusion
- B. The Neo-Brandeisian School
- C. Game Theory
- D. Behavioural Antitrust
- E. Raising Rivals’ Costs
- F. Transaction Cost Economics
- G. Workable Competition
- H. Contestable Markets
- I. The Austrian School
- J. Effective Competition
- A. General
- B. Economic Efficiency and Welfare
- C. Protecting the Competitive Process or Protecting Competition
- D. Protection of Economic Freedom, Protecting Competitors, and the Dispersal of Economic Power
- E. The Public Interest, Fairness, Equality (Economic Equity), and Redistribution
- F. Public Policies
- G. Conclusion
- A. The Objectives of the EU and the Role of the Competition Rules
- B. The Objectives of EU Competition Law
- (i) General
- (ii) The Competition Provisions
- (iii) The Single Market
- (iv) The Early Development of the Law
- (v) ‘Modernisation’ and the Policy of the Commission
- (vi) The Case Law of the EU Courts
- (vii) ‘A Competition Policy Fit For New Challenges’
- (viii) The Revision of the Commission’s Policy towards Article 102
- (ix) Public Policy Considerations and EU Competition Law
- A. Form, Effects, Presumptions, and Theories of Harm
- B. Over- and Under-Enforcement: Type 1 and Type 2 Errors
- C. The Use of Economic Analysis
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- 3. Introduction to the European Union
- A. The History of the European Union
- B. The EU Treaties
- C. The Non-Judicial EU Institutions
- (i) General
- (ii) The European Council
- (iii) The Council of the European Union
- (iv) The European Parliament
- (v) The European Commission and DG Comp
- (vi) The Advisory Committee on Restrictive Practices and Dominant Positions and the Advisory Committee on Concentrations
- (vii) The European Ombudsman
- D. EU Legislative and Other Acts
- E. The EU Courts
- F. General Principles of EU Law and Fundamental (Human) Rights
- 4. The Competition Provisions
- A. General
- (i) Article 3(1)(g) of the EC Treaty
- (ii) The Main Treaty Provisions and the Merger Regulation
- B. The Substantive Competition Provisions of the TFEU
- (i) Article 101 TFEU
- (ii) Article 102 TFEU
- (iii) Article 106
- (iv) Article 37 TFEU
- C. The Procedural Provisions
- (i) Article 103 TFEU
- a. Implementing Legislation
- b. Block Exemptions
- c. Other Regulations and Measures Adopted by the Commission
- (ii) Article 104 TFEU
- (iii) Article 105 TFEU
- (i) Article 103 TFEU
- D. The European Merger Regulation (EUMR)
- E. Other Relevant Treaty Provisions
- A. General
- 5. Communications and Notices
- 6. Regulation 1/2003 and Modernisation
- 7. Particular Sectors
- A. Coal and Steel
- B. Atomic Energy
- C. Agriculture
- D. Transport
- E. Other Sectors Subject to Liberalisation
- F. Sport
- G. Security Connected with Military Equipment
- 8. The Competition Rules and the European Economic Area
- 9. Conclusions
- 10. Further Reading
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- 3. Market Power
- 4. Market Definition and EU Competition Law
- A. The Purpose of Market Definition
- B. The Definition of the Relevant Market
- C. The Commission Notices on the Definition of the Relevant Market for the Purposes of EU Competition Law
- (i) The 1997 Notice
- (ii) The New Notice on the Definition of the Relevant Market
- (iii) The Definition of the Relevant Market in the Notices
- (iv) The General Principles of Market Definition
- D. Demand and Supply Substitution
- E. Demand Substitution
- (i) Measuring Demand Substitution in Product Markets
- (ii) The SSNIP Test
- (iii) Problems with the SSNIP test
- a. The Cellophane Fallacy
- b. Zero-price Markets
- (iv) The SSNIP test in the Draft Notice
- F. Supply Substitution in Product Markets
- G. Evidence used in Defining Markets
- (i) General
- (ii) Product Markets and Demand Substitution
- a. Characteristics, Price, and Intended Use
- b. Past Substitution
- c. Hypothetical substitution
- d. Evidence on Competitive Constraints Based on Industry Views
- e. Barriers and Costs from Switching
- f. The SSNIP Test
- (iii) Product Markets and Supply Substitution
- (iv) Gathering Evidence
- H. The Geographic Market
- (i) General
- (ii) Evidence for Defining Geographic Markets
- (iii) Categories of Evidence
- a. The Identity of Available Suppliers, Market Shares, and Prices
- b. Customer Preferences and Purchasing Behaviour
- c. Barriers and Costs Associated with Supplying in Different Areas
- d. Distance-related Factors, Transport Costs, and Catchment Areas
- e. Trade Flows and Pattern of Shipments
- I. Particular Issues in Market Definition
- (i) Chains of Substitution and Differentiated Products
- (ii) Distinct Groups of Customers and Price Discrimination
- (iii) The Structure of Supply and Demand
- (iv) Bundles, Aftermarkets, and Ecosystems
- a. One Market or Two?
- b. Aftermarkets
- c. Digital Ecosystems
- (v) Multi-sided Markets and Zero-prices
- (vi) Markets for Raw Materials and ‘Inputs’
- (vii) Markets Created by State Regulation
- (viii) Markets in the Pharmaceutical Sector
- (ix) Markets in Highly Innovative Industries
- (x) Markets on the Buying Side (Procurement Markets)
- J. The Calculation of Market Shares
- A. The Role of Barriers to Entry
- (i) The Definition of a Barrier to Entry
- B. Types of Barrier to Entry
- (i) Sunk Costs
- (ii) Structural Barriers
- (iii) Strategic Behaviour by Incumbents
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- 3. The Text and Scheme of Article 101
- A. The Three Paragraphs
- (i) The Text
- (ii) The Article 101(1) Prohibition
- (iii) Nullity
- (iv) Article 101(3)—Legal Exception
- B. The Consequences of Infringement
- C. Burden and Standard of Proof
- A. The Three Paragraphs
- 4. The Interpretation and Application of Article 101(1)
- A. ‘Undertaking’ and ‘Associations of Undertakings’
- (i) Every Entity Engaged in an Economic Activity
- (ii) The Legal Status or Form or the Entity Is Immaterial
- (iii) Distinguishing Economic Activity from Functions Which Are Not Economic
- a. Characterising Economic Activity
- b. Exercise of Public Powers in the Public Interest or Exercise of Official Authority
- c. Social Security Schemes, Healthcare, and Social Services: Activities Fulfilling an Exclusively Social Function
- d. Purchasing of Goods and Services by an Entity Not Engaged in Economic Activity
- (iv) The Notion of an Undertaking Is a Relative Concept
- (v) Employees and Trade Unions
- (vi) Summary
- (vii) Single Economic Units
- a. The Undertaking as a Single Economic Unit—Natural Persons, Legal Persons, Principal–Agent and Parent–Subsidiary Relationships
- b. Consequences of the Single Economic Unit Doctrine
- c. The Boundaries of the Economic Unit: Parent and Subsidiary
- d. The Boundaries of an Economic Unit: A Single Concept and Proper Basis for Parental Liability?
- e. The Boundaries of the Economic Unit on a Dynamic Basis
- (viii) Associations of Undertakings
- a. Institutionalised Forms of Cooperation
- b. The Relationship between Associations of Undertakings and Undertakings
- A. ‘Undertaking’ and ‘Associations of Undertakings’
- B. The Meaning of ‘Agreement’, ‘Decision’, and ‘Concerted Practice’
- (i) Introduction
- (ii) Collusion Orchestrated by Employees
- (iii) Agreement
- a. A Concurrence of Wills
- b. Agreements between Undertakings Operating at Different Levels of the Economy or in Separate Markets
- c. Collective Bargaining Agreements
- d. Participation in Meetings—Passive Participation in an Agreement
- e. Vertical Agreements and Unilateral Conduct
- f. Hub and Spoke Arrangements
- g. Recommendations by Bodies Constituted under Statutory Powers
- (iv) Concerted Practices
- a. Description of a Concerted Practice
- b. The Need for Concertation, Conduct (Implementation), and a Relationship of Cause and Effect between the Two
- c. Direct Contact—Frequent or Isolated Exchanges, or Disclosure, of Information
- d. Indirect Contact/Sharing of Information and Hub and Spoke Arrangements
- e. Parallel Behaviour, Price Signalling, and Online Exchanges
- f. Concerted Practice and Vertical Arrangements
- (v) Decisions by Associations of Undertakings
- a. Medium for a Cartel
- b. Trade Association Recommendations
- c. Medium for Exchange of Information
- d. Certification Schemes
- e. The Trade Association’s Constitution
- (vi) Complex Arrangements and Single Infringements
- a. The Concept of a Single Infringement and its Implications
- b. A Single Infringement—Elements
- c. A Single Infringement or Separate Infringements?
- d. Who Are the Participants in the Single Infringement?
- e. Facilitators and Liability for Independent Service Providers
- (i) Jurisdictional Limit
- (ii) The Tests
- (iii) Pattern of Trade Test
- (iv) An Increase in Trade
- (v) Partitioning of the Internal Market
- (vi) Agreements Operating in One Member State
- (vii) Restrictions on Competition and Restrictions on Trade
- (viii) Agreements Which Appreciably Affect Trade between Member States
- (ix) The Relationship between EU and National Law
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction and Background
- A. Article 101(1) and Article 101(3)
- B. Possible Ways of Reconciling Article 101(1) and Article 101(3)
- C. The Interpretation of ‘Object or Effect is the Prevention, Restriction, or Distortion of Competition’—the Early Approach
- D. Section 1 of the Sherman Act
- E. Modernisation
- (i) Substantive Analysis and Procedural Steps
- (ii) Identifying Anti-competitive Agreements: Clear Rules or More Complex Standards?
- A. Object or Effect
- B. Agreements that Restrict Competition by Object: Restraints Which Reveal a Sufficiently Deleterious Impact on Competition
- (i) Identifying Restrictions by Object—Content, Objectives, and Context
- (ii) Content—Restrictive Clauses in the Agreement
- (iii) The Importance of Context in Identifying the Purpose or Objective of the Agreement
- a. A Risk of Over-expansion of the Object Category
- b. Clarification of the Role of Context and the Restrictive Nature of the Object Category
- c. Contextual Analysis in the Cases
- d. Context, Characterisation, and Ancillary Restraints
- (iv) Object Restraints and Actual or Likely Effects
- (v) Object Cases and Appreciability
- (vi) Restrictions by Object and ‘Hardcore’ Restraints
- C. Establishing Restrictive Effects
- (i) General
- (ii) Appraisal of an Agreement in its Legal and Economic Context
- (iii) Does the Agreement Enable the Parties to Exercise Market Power?
- (iv) Restraints on Competition between a Supplier’s Distributors (Intra-brand Competition)
- (v) Appreciability
- D. Ancillary, or Objectively Necessary, Restraints
- (i) Remia and Nutricia
- (ii) Pronuptia
- (iii) Gøttrup-Klim
- (iv) MasterCard
- E. Restraints Inherent in the Pursuit of a Legitimate (Public Policy?) Objective: Wouters and Meca-Medina
- F. Conclusions and Reflections on Article 101(1) Analysis
- A. Application of Article 101(3)
- B. Burden and Standard of Proof
- C. Any Agreement May in Principle Benefit from Article 101(3)
- D. The Article 101(3) Criteria
- (i) Criterion 1: The Agreement Must Lead to an Improvement in the Production or Distribution of Goods or the Promotion of Technical or Economic Progress
- a. Article 101(3) Benefits
- b. Efficiency Gains
- c. Non-competition Factors
- (ii) Criterion 2: Allowing Consumers a Fair Share of the Resulting Benefit
- (iii) Criterion 3: Indispensable Restrictions
- (iv) Criterion 4: The Agreement Must Not Afford the Parties the Possibility of Eliminating Competition
- (i) Criterion 1: The Agreement Must Lead to an Improvement in the Production or Distribution of Goods or the Promotion of Technical or Economic Progress
- E. Block Exemptions
- (i) General
- (ii) Current Block Exemptions
- (iii) Direct Applicability
- (iv) Market Share Thresholds
- (v) ‘Hardcore’ Restraints
- (vi) Withdrawal of Block Exemptions
- (vii) Safe Harbours and Relationship with Article 101(1)
- F. Unilateral Action and Article 101(3)
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- 3. The Text and Scheme of Article 102
- A. The Prohibition
- B. The Enforcement of Article 102
- (i) Complaints to Competition Authorities
- (ii) Infringement Decisions, Fines, and Other Remedies
- (iii) Commitments Decisions
- (iv) Judicial Review in Article 102 Cases
- (v) Private Actions in National Courts and Article 267 References
- A. The Meaning of One or More Undertakings
- (i) General
- (ii) Public Bodies and Bodies Performing Public Functions
- (iii) Collective Dominance
- B. A Dominant Position
- C. A Dominant Position Within a Substantial Part of the Internal Market
- (i) Purpose of the Requirement
- (ii) Meaning of a Substantial Part of the Internal Market
- (iii) Relevance of Volume of Production
- (iv) A Member State is Likely to be a Substantial Part of the Internal Market
- (v) Transport Cases
- D. Abuse
- E. An Effect on Trade between Member States
- (i) General
- (ii) Abuse of a Dominant Position Covering Several Member States
- (iii) Abuse of a Dominant Position Covering a Single Member State
- (iv) Abuse of a Dominant Position Covering only Part of a Member State
- (v) Abuses Involving Trade with Third Countries
- (vi) Regulation 1/2003, Article 3
- A. The Review of Article 102
- B. The Staff Discussion Paper
- C. The Guidance Paper
- (i) The Road to the Guidance Paper
- (ii) The Content of the Guidance Paper
- (iii) The Effect of the Guidance Paper
- (iv) The Amendments to the Guidance Paper
- A. The Definition of a Dominant Position in the Case Law
- B. Dominant Position in the Guidance Paper
- C. Effects-based Analysis and the Concept of Dominance
- D. Establishing Dominance: A Two-stage Approach
- A. General
- (i) Substitutability
- (ii) The United Brands Case
- (iii) The Michelin Case
- (iv) The France Télécom Case
- (v) Market Definition in Multi-sided Markets: The Google Shopping Case
- (vi) Demand Substitution in Zero-price Markets
- (vii) Chains of Substitution and Products with Multiple Applications
- (viii) The Structure of Supply and Demand
- (ix) One Product Market or Two
- (x) Primary and Secondary Markets (Aftermarkets)
- (xi) Ecosystems
- (xii) Markets for Raw Materials and Inputs
- (xiii) Markets on the Buying Side (Procurement Markets)
- (xiv) Supply Substitution
- B. The Geographic Market
- C. The Temporal Market
- A. General
- B. Market Shares
- (i) General
- (ii) The Calculation of Market Shares
- (iii) High Market Shares
- (iv) Relative Market Shares
- (v) Market Share and the Commission Guidance Paper
- (vi) Low Market Shares and Dominance
- (vii) Market Shares in the Digital Economy
- (viii) Market Shares in the Case of Collective Dominance
- C. Other Factors Indicating Dominance and Barriers to Entry
- (i) General
- (ii) Indications from the Undertaking
- a. The Undertaking’s Own Assessment of its Position
- b. Profits
- c. Performance Indicators and Price Levels
- d. Overall Size and Strength and Range of Products (Portfolio Power)
- (iii) Barriers to Entry and Expansion
- (iv) Summary of Barriers to Entry for the Purposes of Article 102
- a. Economies of Scale and Scope and Sunk Costs
- b. Access to Key Inputs or Facilities
- c. Access to Financial Resources and the Need for Investment
- d. Legal and Regulatory Barriers and Intellectual Property Rights
- e. Superior Technology
- f. Established Distribution and Sales Networks
- g. Vertical Integration
- h. Advertising, Reputation, Product Differentiation
- i. Opportunity Costs
- j. Switching Costs
- k. Network Effects and Multi-sided Markets
- l. Conduct
- m. An Unavoidable Trading Partner
- 12. Further Reading
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- 3. The Meaning of Abuse
- A. General
- B. Types of Abuse Covered by Article 102 TFEU
- (i) Categories of Abuse
- C. Article 102 Covers Exploitative and Exclusionary Abuses
- (i) The Continental Can Case
- (ii) Application of Article 102 after Continental Can
- D. The Broad Nature of the Concept of Abuse
- (i) The Definition of ‘Abuse’
- (ii) Market Power Does Not Need to be Used for an Abuse to be Committed
- (iii) Abuse as an Objective Concept
- (iv) The ‘Special Responsibility’ of Dominant Undertakings
- (v) Super-dominance
- E. Exclusionary Abuses: Distinguishing Abusive Conducts from ‘Competition on the Merits’
- F. Form- and Effects-based Analysis
- G. Appreciability
- 4. The Commission’s Approach to Exclusionary Abuses in the Guidance Paper: The ‘Anti-competitive Foreclosure’ Concept
- 5. Objective Justification, Efficiencies, and Other Defences
- A. General
- B. Objective Justification in Post Danmark I
- C. Objective Necessity
- D. Efficiencies
- E. Protecting the Undertaking’s Own Commercial Interests or Meeting Competition
- 6. Dominance and Abuse on Different Markets: ‘Leveraging’ of Market Power as a Theory of Harm
- 7. General Issues in Respect of Abuses Concerning Prices
- A. Exploitative and Exclusionary Pricing Policies
- B. Price Discrimination
- (i) What is Price Discrimination?
- (ii) Primary Line and Secondary Line Injury
- C. Cost Levels
- D. The ‘As Efficient Competitor’ (AEC) Test
- 8. Predatory Pricing
- A. General
- B. The Areeda–Turner Test
- C. The Test Laid Down in AKZO
- (i) The AKZO Case
- (ii) The Criteria Laid Down in AKZO
- a. Problems with Costs-based Tests
- b. Rational Reasons for Below AVC Pricing
- c. Ascertaining Intention Between AVC and ATC
- d. Selective Below-cost Pricing
- D. The Post Danmark I Case
- E. The ‘Meeting Competition’ Defence and Predatory Pricing
- F. Recoupment
- (i) The Possibility of Recoupment
- (ii) The EU Case Law
- G. Predatory Pricing in the Guidance Paper and the ‘Sacrifice’ Principle
- H. Predatory Pricing in High Tech and Digital Markets
- I. Selective Above-cost Pricing
- A. General
- B. The Case Law
- (i) Deutsche Telekom
- (ii) TeliaSonera
- (iii) Margin Squeeze in Practice: Telecommunications and Beyond
- C. Margin Squeeze in the Guidance Paper
- D. Comment
- A. General
- B. Exclusive Dealing: An Abuse ‘By Object’ or ‘By Effect’?
- (i) Hoffmann-La Roche: The Abusive Nature of Exclusive Dealing
- (ii) Intel: Revisiting the ‘By Object’ Condemnation of Exclusivity Practices
- (iii) Post-Intel: Where Do We Stand on Assessment of Exclusive Dealing?
- a. Scope of Application of the Intel Judgment to Exclusivity Practices
- b. Relevance of the Hoffmann-La Roche Presumption Post-Intel
- c. ‘Capacity to Foreclosure’ and the As Efficient Competitor Test
- d. Beyond Commission Enforcement
- (i) Exclusive Purchasing
- (ii) Exclusive Distribution
- (iii) Exclusivity and Loyalty(-Inducing) Rebates
- (iv) Exclusivity Payments or ‘Naked Restrictions’
- A. General
- B. The Commercial Rationale for Tying and Bundling
- C. The Economic Arguments over Tying and Bundling
- D. Tying and Bundling and Article 102
- E. The Case Law
- (i) Contractual or ‘Classical’ Tying
- (ii) Mixed Bundling
- (iii) Technical Tying and the Microsoft Case
- (iv) The Google Android Case
- a. Tying of Google’s Proprietary Apps
- b. ‘Anti-fragmentation’ Licensing Obligations
- (v) Tying after Google Android: The Facebook Marketplace investigation
- F. Tying and Bundling in the Guidance Paper
- (i) General
- (ii) The Tying and the Tied Goods are Two Separate Products
- (iii) Anti-competitive Foreclosure
- (iv) Multi-product Rebates (Mixed Bundling)
- (v) Efficiencies
- A. General
- B. The Exclusion of Competitors from Downstream Markets
- (i) The Commercial Solvents Case
- (ii) Case Law After Commercial Solvents
- (iii) The ‘Essential Facilities’ Concept in EU law
- C. The Rise and Fall of the Bronner Criteria
- (i) What Constitutes a ‘Refusal’ to Supply?
- (ii) Indispensability
- (iii) Refusal to Supply and the ‘Telefónica Exceptions’
- (iv) Elimination of Competition
- (v) Absence of Objective Justification
- (vi) [The Absence of a] New Product Requirement
- D. Refusal to Supply and Intellectual Property Rights
- (i) General
- (ii) The Magill Case
- (iii) The IMS Case
- E. Refusal to Supply and Interoperability—The Microsoft Case
- F. Refusal to Supply in Situations Not Involving Upstream/Downstream Markets
- G. Refusal to Supply in the Guidance Paper
- A. General
- B. The Google Shopping Case
- C. Self-preferencing After Google Shopping
- D. Comment
- A. General
- B. Pursuit of Legal Proceedings, Vexatious Litigation, and Enforcing Legal Rights
- C. ‘Regulatory Gaming’
- (i) The AstraZeneca Case
- a. Misrepresentations to National Patent Offices and National Courts
- b. Withdrawal of the Marketing Authorisations
- (ii) Teva and ‘Divisionals Games’
- (iii) Pay-to-delay as Abuse of Dominance
- (iv) Standard-essential Patents and Patent Ambushes
- (i) The AstraZeneca Case
- D. the acquisition of intellectual property rights and/or competing technologies
- E. Vertical and Horizontal Integration
- F. Disparagement of Rivals
- A. Introduction to Article 102(c)
- B. Exclusionary Practices Under Article 102(c)
- C. Discrimination on Grounds of Nationality or Geographic Location
- D. Secondary Line Discrimination and ‘Competitive Disadvantage’
- A. Unfairly High or Low Pricing
- (i) Unfairly High Prices
- a. General
- b. Ascertaining What Constitutes an Unfairly High Price: The Concept of ‘Economic Value’
- c. The Future of the Excessive Pricing Under Article 102
- (ii) Low Prices on the Buying Side
- (i) Unfairly High Prices
- B. Imposing Unfair Trading Conditions and Entering into Restrictive Agreements
- C. Inefficiency and Limiting Production
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- 3. Article 4(3) TEU
- 4. Article 106
- A. The Objectives of Article 106
- B. The Format of Article 106
- (i) Article 106(1): Prohibition Addressed to Member States
- (ii) Article 106(2): Provision Addressed to Undertakings Providing for Limited Immunity from the Treaty Rules
- (iii) Article 106(3): Policing and Legislative Powers of the Commission
- A. Definitions
- (i) ‘Public Undertakings’
- (ii) Undertakings Granted Special or Exclusive Rights
- (iii) ‘Measures’
- B. Measures Forbidden by Article 106(1)
- (i) Introduction
- (ii) Höfner v Macrotron
- (iii) ERT v DEP
- (iv) Merci Convenzionali
- (v) RTT v GB-INNO-BM
- (vi) Corbeau
- (vii) La Crespelle
- (viii) Albany
- (ix) Deutsche Post
- (x) Ambulanz Glöckner
- (xi) Connect Austria
- (xii) MOTOE
- (xiii) DEI
- (xiv) Slovenská Pošta
- C. Summary of the Situations Which Infringe Article 106(1) in Conjunction with Article 102
- (i) Inability to Meet Demand
- (ii) The Cumulation of Rights Conferred on an Undertaking Create a Conflict of Interest
- (iii) The Extension of the Dominant Position
- (iv) Inequality of Opportunity and Distortion of Competition
- (v) Pricing Abuses
- (vi) Refusal to Supply
- (vii) ‘Automatic’ Abuse
- A. The Institutional Setting of Services of General Economic Interest
- (i) Article 14 TFEU and Protocols 26 and 29
- a. Article 14 TFEU
- b. Protocol (No. 26) on Services of General Interest
- c. Protocol 29 on Public Broadcasting
- (ii) Article 36 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
- (iii) Commission Communications on Services of General Economic Interest and Services of General Interest
- (i) Article 14 TFEU and Protocols 26 and 29
- B. The Concepts and Terminology of ‘Services of General Economic Interest’ and ‘Services of General Interest’
- C. The Purpose of Article 106(2)
- D. Undertakings Having the Character of a Revenue-Producing Monopoly
- E. Undertakings Entrusted with the Operation of Services of General Economic Interest
- (i) ‘Undertakings Entrusted With … ’
- (ii) Operation of Services of General Economic Interest
- (iii) Obstruct the Performance of the Particular Tasks Assigned to Them
- F. No Effect on Trade Contrary to the Interests of the Union
- A. Article 106(1)
- B. Article 106(2)
- A. The Ambit of the Provision
- B. Decisions
- C. Directives
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- A. General
- B. Cartels and Collusion—Explicit and Tacit
- (i) Cartels—Explicit Collusion
- a. Introduction
- b. The Incentives for, and Complications Involved in, the Operation of a Cartel
- c. Alignment, Detection, and Punishment of Deviation: Markets Prone to Explicit Collusion
- d. The Desire to Combat and Eliminate Cartels
- (ii) Tacit Collusion and the Oligopoly Problem
- (i) Cartels—Explicit Collusion
- C. Competition Law and Collusion (Explicit and Tacit)
- 3. Cartels
- A. Substantive Analysis under Article 101
- (i) Cartels Are Intrinsically Detrimental to the Competitive Process and Not Related to the Lawful Realisation of Efficiencies
- (ii) Price-fixing
- (iii) Buyer Cartels, Wage-fixing, and No-poach Agreements
- (iv) Restrictions on Output or Production
- (v) Market-sharing
- (vi) Collusive Tendering or Bid Rigging
- (vii) Bolstering Provisions and Restrictions on Non-price Trading Conditions or on Non-price Parameters of Competition
- B. Proving a Breach
- (i) Establishing the Existence of an Agreement, Concerted Practice, or Decision
- (ii) Parallel Conduct, Conscious Parallelism, and Collusion
- (iii) Unilateral Public Price Announcements in Advance and Price Signalling
- (iv) Collusion, Algorithms, and Online Practices
- (v) Uncovering Collusion
- A. Substantive Analysis under Article 101
- A. Horizontal Agreements Incorporating Severe Restraints Ancillary, or Necessary, to Beneficial Collaboration
- (i) General
- (ii) Price Restraints
- (iii) Joint Purchasing (Price-fixing Amongst Buyers)
- (iv) Output and Production Limitations
- (v) Joint Tendering
- (vi) Market-sharing and Settlement Agreements
- (vii) Restrictions on Advertising
- B. Information-sharing Agreements
- (i) Exchange of Information Between Competitors
- (ii) Assessing the Competitive Effects of an Information-sharing Arrangement under Article 101(1) and Article 101(3)
- a. Characterisation
- b. Object Restrictions
- c. Analysing Other Information Exchanges
- d. Business-to-Business (B2B) Exchanges
- A. The Oligopoly Problem and Article 101
- B. Oligopoly and Article 102
- (i) ‘One or More Undertakings’—Collective Dominance
- (ii) Abuse of a Collective Dominant Position
- a. Overlap with Article 101?
- b. Collective Abuses
- (1) Exploitative Behaviour and Excessive Pricing
- (2) Other Collective Abuses
- c. Abuse by One of the Collectively Dominant Undertakings
- (iii) Conclusions
- C. Alternative Methods for Dealing with Oligopolistic Markets Under Eu Law
- (i) Merger Regulation
- (ii) Sector Inquiries and Broader Solutions
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- 3. Appraisal of Horizontal Cooperation and Joint Ventures: Evolution of Policy
- A. Appraisal under the Eu Merger Regulation or Article 101?
- B. The Evolving eu Approach to Horizontal Cooperation
- (i) General
- (ii) The Development of a More Economic Approach Towards the Application of Article 101 to Horizontal Cooperation
- (iii) The Horizontal Cooperation Guidelines
- A. The Application of Article 101(1)
- B. The Application of Article 101(3)
- (i) The R&D Block Exemption
- (ii) The Individual Application of Article 101(3)
- A. The Application of Article 101(1)
- B. The Application of Article 101(3)
- (i) The Block Exemption for Specialisation Agreements
- (ii) The Individual Application of Article 101(3)
- A. Analysis of Joint Purchasing under Article 101
- B. Cases on Joint Purchasing
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- A. General
- B. Methods of Distribution
- (i) Factors Affecting Choice
- (ii) Vertical Integration
- (iii) Agency and Other Intermediaries
- (iv) Distribution through Independent Distributors
- (v) Distribution and E-commerce
- C. Competition Rules and Distribution
- (i) The Impact of the Competition Rules on Methods of Distribution
- (ii) Intra-undertaking Arrangements: Vertical Integration and Agency Agreements
- a. Parent–Subsidiary Arrangements
- b. Agency Agreements
- c. Agency and Online Platforms
- (iii) Vertical Agreements
- a. Restraints on Conduct and Restrictions of Competition—The Problem
- b. The Positive Effects of Vertical Restraints
- c. Potential Anti-competitive Effects of Vertical Restraints
- A. Background: The Early Approach
- B. The Approach Since 1999: The Block Exemption and Reform
- C. Methodology
- A. Restrictions by Object
- (i) Identifying Object Restraints
- (ii) Resale Price Maintenance, ATP, Export, and Online Sales Bans
- (iii) Other Object Restraints and Selective Distribution
- B. Analysing the Restrictive ‘Effect’ of Vertical Agreements
- (i) Introduction
- (ii) Single Branding Agreements and Delimitis
- (iii) Exclusive Distribution Agreements and STM
- (iv) Franchising Agreements and Pronuptia de Paris
- (v) Online Sales and Online Advertising Restrictions
- (vi) Parity Obligations
- (vii) Tying
- (viii) Other Restraints
- (ix) Effects Analysis—The Need to Develop a Clearer Framework?
- C. Selective Distribution Agreements
- (i) The Metro Criteria
- (ii) The Characteristics or the Nature of the Product
- (iii) Qualitative Not Quantitative Criteria Applied Uniformly, and in a Non-discriminatory Manner
- (iv) The Criteria Must Not Go Beyond What is Necessary for the Product in Question
- (v) Object or Effect Analysis?
- A. General
- B. The Block Exemptions
- C. The Vertical Block Exemption Regulation —Regulation 2022/720
- (i) The Background
- (ii) Article 1—Definitions
- (iii) Article 2—The Main Exemption: Scope and Limitations
- a. An Umbrella Exemption Applying to Vertical Agreements
- b. Vertical Agreements in the Online Platform Economy
- c. Association of Retailers of Goods
- d. Provisions Relating to the Assignment of Intellectual Property Rights
- e. Agreements Between Competing Undertakings
- f. Agreements Falling Within the Scope of Another Block Exemption
- (iv) Article 3—The Market Share Cap
- (v) Article 4—Hardcore Restrictions
- a. The VBER is Not Applicable to Agreements Containing Hardcore Restraints
- b. Article 4(a): Resale Price Maintenance
- c. Article 4(b)–(e): Territorial and Customer Restraints and Online Restraints
- (1) Exclusive Distribution
- (2) Selective Distribution
- (3) Free Distribution
- d. Article 4(f): Restrictions on Sales of Spare Parts
- (vi) Article 5—Excluded Restraints: Severable, Non-exempted Obligations
- a. Obligations Which are Excluded (Not Exempted) But Which May Be Severable
- b. Article 5(1): Non-compete Obligations
- c. Article 5(1)(b): Non-compete Obligations after the Termination of the Agreement
- d. Article 5(1)(c): Non-compete Obligations and Selective Distribution Systems
- e. Across-platform Retail Parity Obligations
- (vii) Article 6—Withdrawal of the Block Exemption
- (viii) Article 7—Non-application of the Regulation
- (ix) Articles 8, 9, and 10—Market Share, Turnover, and Transitional Provisions
- (x) Article 11—Commencement, Expiry, and Review
- D. The Motor Vehicle Distribution Block Exemption
- E. Article 101(3)—Individual Assessment
- (i) Introduction
- (ii) ‘Hardcore’ Restraints
- (iii) Other Restraints
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- A. General
- B. Types of Intellectual Property Rights
- (i) The Nature of Intellectual Property Rights
- (ii) Patents
- (iii) Trademarks
- (iv) Copyright
- (v) Databases
- (vi) Designs
- (vii) Know-how
- C. The Relationship between Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Law
- D. The Relationship between Intellectual Property Rights and the Free Movement Rules
- 3. Exploiting Intellectual Property Rights by Licensing
- A. General
- B. Commercial Considerations in Licences
- (i) General
- (ii) Royalties
- (iii) Territorial Restrictions on Production: Exclusive and Sole Licences
- (iv) Territorial Sales Restrictions and Customer Allocation
- (v) Field of Use Restrictions
- (vi) Tying and Bundling
- (vii) Non-compete Obligations
- (viii) Non-challenge Clauses
- (ix) Improvements
- C. Development of Competition Policy Towards Licensing of Intellectual Property
- (i) Overview
- (ii) The Evolution of the Commission’s Policy Towards Licensing Agreements
- (iii) The Case Law of the Court
- (iv) Block Exemptions: 1996–2004
- D. The 2014 TTBER and the Technology Transfer Guidelines
- (i) Methodology
- (ii) General Principles: Application of Article 101 to Intellectual Property Rights
- A. General
- B. The Scheme of the TTBER
- C. Principal Features of the TTBER
- D. Scope of the TTBER
- (i) Agreements to Which the TTBER May Apply
- a. Article 2 TTBER
- b. Bilateral Technology Transfer Agreement
- c. The Agreement Must Concern the Production of Contract Products
- (ii) Relationship with Other Block Exemptions
- (i) Agreements to Which the TTBER May Apply
- E. Safe Harbour: The Market Share Thresholds
- (i) The Market Share Thresholds
- (ii) Market Definition
- a. The Technology Market
- b. The Product Market
- (iii) Market Shares
- a. Means of Calculation
- b. The Technology Market
- c. The Product Market
- (iv) The Distinction Between Competitors and Non-competitors
- (v) Non-competitors Who Subsequently Become Competitors
- F. Hardcore Restrictions
- (i) General
- (ii) Agreements Between Competing Undertakings
- a. Article 4(1)(a)—Price Restrictions
- b. Article 4(1)(b)—Output Limitations
- c. Article 4(1)(c)—Market or Customer Allocation
- (1) Article 4(1)(c)(i)
- (2) Article 4(1)(c)(ii)
- (3) Article 4(1)(c)(iii)
- (4) Article 4(1)(c)(iv)
- d. Article 4(1)(d)—Limitations on Technology Exploitation or R&D
- (iii) Agreements Between Non-competing Undertakings
- a. Article 4(2)(a)—Price Restrictions
- b. Article 4(2)(b)—Passive Sales Restrictions Imposed on the Licensee
- (1) Article 4(2)(b)(i)
- (2) Article 4(2)(b)(ii)
- (3) Article 4(2)(b)(iii)
- (4) Article 4(2)(b)(iv)
- (5) Article 4(2)(b)(v)
- c. Article 4(2)(c)—Active or Passive Sales Bans to End-users within Selective Distribution Systems
- (i) Introduction
- (ii) Article 5(1)(a): Improvements; Exclusive Grant Backs
- (iii) Article 5(1)(b): Non-challenge and Termination Clauses
- (iv) Limitations on Technology Exploitation or R&D
- (i) Withdrawal
- (ii) Disapplication
- A. General Principles
- (i) Technology Transfer Agreements Outside the TTBER
- (ii) No Presumption of Illegality
- (iii) The Second Safe Harbour
- (iv) The Approach to the Analysis of Individual Agreements
- B. Provisions Generally Not Restrictive of Article 101(1)
- C. Licensing Restrictions
- D. Settlement Agreements
- E. Agreement between A Licensor and Licensee Concerning the Dissemination of Information Relating to Marketed Pharmaceutical Products
- F. Technology Pools
- A. General
- B. The Campari and Moosehead/Whitbread Decisions
- C. The Current Position
- A. General
- B. Broadcasting Licences and Performance Copyright
- C. Collective Licensing of Copyright
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- 3. Modernisation and Enforcement under Regulation 1/2003
- 4. The Commission’s Power to Issue Informal Guidance
- 5. Fundamental Human Rights and Competition Enforcement
- 6. Enforcement by the Commission
- A. Introduction
- B. Complaints
- (i) Standing to Submit a Formal Complaint
- (ii) The Complaints Procedure
- (iii) Rejection of a Complaint
- (iv) Acting on a Complaint
- (v) Judicial Review Proceedings
- C. The Investigation Stage of the Administrative Procedure: Fact-finding by the Commission
- (i) General
- (ii) Article 18 Requests for Information
- (iii) Article 20 Inspections of Undertakings
- a. General
- b. The Powers of the Inspectors
- (1) The Power to Enter Any Premises, Land, and Means of Transport of Undertakings and Associations of Undertakings (Article 20(2)(a))
- (2) The Power to Examine Books and Other Records Related to the Business, Irrespective of the Medium on Which They are Stored (Article 20(2)(b))
- (3) The Power to Take or Obtain in Any Form Copies of or Extracts from Such Books or Records (Article 20(2)(c))
- (4) The Power to Seal Any Business Premises and Books or Records for the Period and to the Extent Necessary for the Inspection (Article 20(2)(d))
- (5) The Power to Ask Any Representative or Member of Staff of the Undertaking or Association of Undertakings for Explanations on Facts or Documents Relating to the Subject Matter and Purpose of the Inspection and to Record the Answers
- c. Legal Advice
- (iv) Inspections on Private Premises under Article 21
- (v) The Power to Take Statements
- (vi) The Privilege Against Self-incrimination
- (vii) Legal Professional Privilege
- a. The Extent of Legal Professional Privilege
- b. Procedure in Claims of LPP
- D. The Second, ‘Inter Partes’ or ‘Adversarial’, Stage of the Procedure
- (i) General: The Rights of the Defence and the Right to be Heard
- (ii) State of Play and Other Meetings
- (iii) The Statement of Objections
- (iv) The Hearing Officer
- (v) Access to the File
- a. General
- b. Confidentiality
- c. Confidentiality and Complainants
- d. The Transparency Regulation
- (vi) The Oral Hearing
- E. Commission Decisions
- (i) General
- (ii) Final Decisions: Infringement Decisions under Regulation 1/2003, Article 7
- (iii) Final Decisions: Commitments Decisions under Regulation 1/2003, Article 9
- a. General
- b. The Use of Article 9 Decisions
- c. Proportionality and Article 9 Decisions
- d. The Advantages and Disadvantages of Commitments Decisions
- (iv) Final Decisions: ‘Consent Decrees’ under Article 7?
- (v) Final Decisions: Findings of Inapplicability
- (vi) Procedural Decisions
- (vii) Interim Measures
- F. The Settlement Procedure in Cartel Cases
- (i) Hybrid Settlements
- (ii) Appeal Against Decisions Taken under the Cartel Settlement Procedure
- G. Informal Settlements
- H. Fines and Periodic Penalty Payments
- (i) General
- (ii) Fines for Procedural Infringements
- (iii) Periodic Penalty Payments
- (iv) Fines for Substantive Infringements
- a. Regulation 1/2003, Article 23(2)
- b. The Position of Trade Associations
- c. Intentional or Negligent Infringement
- d. Novelty and Non-imposition of Fines
- e. Development of the Commission’s Fining Policy
- f. The Adoption of the Commission’s 1998 Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines
- g. The 2006 Guidelines on the Method of Setting Fines
- h. Particular Issues in the Application of the Fining Guidelines
- (1) Deterrence
- (2) Aggravating Circumstances
- (3) Mitigating Circumstances
- (4) Ability to Pay
- i. General Principles of Law
- j. Liability for Fines
- k. The Payment and Collection of Fines
- (v) The Leniency Policy in Cartel Cases
- a. General
- b. Immunity
- c. Reductions in the Fine
- d. Corporate Statements and Civil Litigation
- e. The Future of the Leniency Programme: Prospects and Alternatives?
- A. Judicial Review
- (i) General
- (ii) Article 263 TFEU
- (iii) Locus Standi—Who Can Bring an Action?
- (iv) Which Acts Can be Challenged?
- (v) The Grounds of Review
- a. General
- b. Lack of Competence
- c. Infringement of an Essential Procedural Requirement
- d. Infringement of the Treaties or Any Rule of Law Relating to Their Application
- (vi) Appeals Against Penalties: Article 261 TFEU
- (vii) Burden of Proof, Standard of Proof, and Standard of Review
- (viii) Annulment
- (ix) Appeals from the General Court to the Court of Justice
- (x) Interim Measures by the Court under Article 278 TFEU
- B. Actions for Damages under Article 340 TFEU
- A. General
- B. Enforcement Powers of the National Competition Authorities
- C. Division of Work
- (i) Case Allocation—Which Authority is Well Placed to Deal with a Case?
- (ii) Transfer of Information and Other Assistance
- (iii) Leniency Applications
- D. Consistent Application of Articles 101 and 102
- (i) General
- (ii) Mechanism of Cooperation
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- 3. The Role of Private Antitrust Litigation, its Relationship with Public Enforcement, and the Experience in the US
- 4. Private Enforcement in the EU
- A. Overview: Effective Judicial Protection and the Principle of National Procedural Autonomy
- B. Uniform and Concurrent Application of Articles 101 and 102
- (i) Cooperation Between the Commission and National Courts
- (ii) Judgments Contrary to Decisions of the Commission
- C. The Enforceability of Agreements Infringing Article 101 or 102
- D. Remedies: Injunctions and Damages
- (i) An EU Right to an Injunction
- (ii) Development of an EU Right to Damages
- (iii) The Principle of National Procedural Autonomy—the Difficulties
- (iv) A Need for Clarification and Harmonisation: The EU Package and Damages Directive
- (v) The Provisions of the Damages Directive
- a. The Core Objectives: Full Compensation for All Victims of Antitrust Infringements, Levelling the Playing Field Throughout the EU, and Coordination of Public and Private Enforcement
- b. The Compensatory Approach
- c. Disclosure
- d. Follow-on Actions, Limitation, and Joint and Several Liability
- e. Consensual Dispute Resolution
- f. The Impact of the Directive
- (vi) Litigation post-Directive
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- A. What is a Merger?
- B. The Purposes of Merger Control
- (i) A Damaging Effect on Competition
- a. Horizontal Mergers
- b. Vertical Mergers
- c. Conglomerate Mergers
- d. Efficiency
- e. Failing Undertakings
- (ii) Evolving Policy Towards Mergers
- (iii) Public Interest Concerns
- a. Fear of Big Business
- b. National or European Champions
- c. Special Sectors and Foreign Control
- d. Unemployment
- e. Data
- f. Sustainability
- (i) A Damaging Effect on Competition
- C. The History of the European Merger Control Regulation
- (i) The Initial Lacuna and the Drive for Merger Control at the EU Level
- (ii) The Catalysts for the EUMR
- (iii) The Original Merger Control Regulation—Council Regulation (EEC) 4064/89
- (iv) The Current Merger Control Regulation, Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004
- (v) Subsequent Review
- D. Scheme of the European Union Merger Regulations
- A. Concentrations
- (i) Definition
- a. Article 3(1)(a)—Mergers Between Previously Independent Undertakings
- b. Article 3(1)(b)—Acquisition of Control
- (1) Decisive Influence
- (2) Sole Control
- (3) Joint Control
- (4) Changes in the Quality of Control
- (i) Definition
- (ii) Joint Ventures
- a. Introduction
- b. ‘Full-function’ Joint Ventures
- (1) The Relevance of Coordination of Competitive Behaviour
- (i) A Bright-line Jurisdictional Test and Simplified Procedure
- (ii) Article 1(2)
- (iii) Article 1(3) of the EUMR
- (iv) Concentrations, Undertakings Concerned, and Calculation of Worldwide and Community-wide Turnover
- a. Examples
- (1) Group A
- (2) Group B
- (3) Group C
- 1. A Acquires B
- 2. C Acquires Sole Control of A
- 3. J Acquires Sole Control of B (a Change from Joint Control with K to Sole Control by J)
- 4. A and B Acquire joint Control of C
- a. Examples
- (i) Exclusive Competence of the Commission under the EUMR
- (ii) Case Referrals
- (iii) Article 9—Distinct Markets
- a. Objective of Article 9
- b. The Article 9 Procedure
- c. A Reference Back
- d. Examples of Article 9 Decisions
- (iv) Article 4(4) Request for Referral to a National Competition Authority
- (v) Article 21(4)—Legitimate Interests
- (i) National Law Applies
- (ii) Joint Ventures
- (iii) Article 22, Referrals to the Commission
- a. Background
- b. The Article 22 Procedure
- (iv) Article 4(5), Request for a Referral to the Commission
- (i) The Relevance of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
- (ii) The Commission, National Competition Authorities, and National Courts
- A. Notification
- B. Reasoned Submissions
- (i) Background
- (ii) Article 4(4), Request for Referral to a National Competition Authority
- (iii) Article 4(5), Request for a Referral to the Commission
- C. Suspension
- D. Phase I Investigation
- (i) Article 6(1)(a)
- (ii) Article 6(1)(b)
- (iii) Article 6(1)(c)
- E. Phase II
- F. Conduct of Merger Investigations
- G. Summary
- A. Background
- B. Reform and the New Substantive Test
- C. Burden and Standard of Proof
- (i) Burden on Proof
- (ii) Standard of Proof
- D. A Significant Impediment to Effective Competition
- (i) General and definition
- (ii) Market Power and Market Definition
- E. Competitive Assessment of Horizontal Mergers
- (i) Introduction and Overview
- (ii) Market Shares, Concentration Levels, and GUPPI
- (iii) Non-coordinated Anti-competitive Effects
- a. The Market Shares Held by the Merging Firms and the Closeness of Competition Between Them
- b. The Ability of Customers to Switch
- c. The Likelihood That Competitors Will Increase Supply
- d. The Competitive Force Eliminated by the Merger
- (iv) Coordinated Anti-competitive Effects—Collective or Joint Dominance
- a. Background
- b. Establishing Coordinated Effects (or Collective Dominance)
- (v) Countervailing Buyer Power
- (vi) Entry Analysis and Barriers to Entry and Expansion
- (vii) Efficiencies
- a. An Efficiency Defence
- b. The Horizontal Merger Guidelines
- (1) Benefit to Consumers
- (2) Merger Specificity
- (3) Verifiability
- (4) Cases
- (viii) The Failing Firm Defence or Rescue Mergers
- (i) The Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines
- (ii) Market Shares and Concentration Levels
- (iii) Assessment of Vertical Mergers
- a. Non-coordinated Effects: Foreclosure
- b. Incentives to Foreclose and Article 102 TFEU
- c. Other Non-coordinated Effects and Coordinated Effects in Vertical Mergers
- (iv) Assessment of Conglomerate Mergers
- a. GE/Honeywell and Tetra Laval/Sidel
- b. Non-coordinated Effects—Foreclosure
- c. Portfolio Power and Foreclosure
- d. Coordinated Effects
- (i) General
- (ii) Other Policies as a Countervailing Factor
- (iii) Other Policies Where the Concentration Does Not Significantly Impede Effective Competition
- (i) Legal Basis and Time Periods
- (ii) The Commission’s Notice on Remedies Acceptable under the EUMR
- (iii) Types of Commitments
- (iv) Divestiture
- (v) Other Remedies: Access Remedies, Behavioural Commitments, and ‘Remedy Packages’
- (vi) Other Cases
- (vii) Breach of a Condition or Obligations
- (viii) Modification and Waiver of Commitments
- A. Cooperation with Other Competition Authorities
- B. The Long Arm of the EUMR
- C. Reciprocity
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- 3. Competition Dynamics in the Digital Economy
- 4. EU Competition Law Enforcement in the Digital Sphere
- 5. Enforcement Challenges in Digital Markets
- A. Scope of Application of the EU Competition Rules
- (i) Market Definition
- (ii) Market Power Assessment
- (iii) Concepts of ‘Agreement’ and ‘Concerted Practice’
- B. Novel or Controversial Theories of Harm
- (i) Self-preferencing
- (ii) Non-compliance with Data Protection Obligations
- (iii) Refusal to Supply ‘Big Data’
- C. Speed of Intervention
- D. Effectiveness of Remedies Imposed
- A. Scope of Application of the EU Competition Rules
- 6. Beyond Competition ‘Law’?
- A. Enhanced Regulation of the Digital Economy— A Global Preoccupation?
- B. Developments at EU Level: P2B Regulation, ‘New Competition Tool’ and the Digital Services Act Package
- C. Digital Markets Act
- (i) Designation as a ‘Gatekeeper’ Providing ‘Core Market Services’
- (ii) Obligations Applying to Gatekeepers
- (iii) Enforcement Framework of the DMA
- (iv) The Nature of the Obligations under the DMA
- (v) Comment
- 1. Central Issues
- 2. Introduction
- 3. International Law
- 4. US Law
- A. General
- B. The Effects Doctrine
- C. Enforcement and the Reactions of Other States
- D. Foreign Plaintiffs in US Courts
- E. The Effects Doctrine and Foreign Conduct Affecting Exports
- 5. EU Law
- A. General
- B. The Single Economic Entity Doctrine
- C. The Implementation Doctrine
- D. The Qualified Effects Doctrine
- (i) The Meaning of ‘Qualified’ Effects
- (ii) The Gencor Case
- a. The Terms of the Merger Regulation
- b. The Gencor Judgment
- (iii) The InnoLux Case
- (iv) The Intel Case
- a. The Commission Decision
- b. Intel in the General Court
- c. The Intel Case in the Court of Justice
- E. Jurisdiction and Private Litigation
- F. Enforcement Jurisdiction
- A. General
- B. EU Bilateral Agreements
- (i) EU-US Cooperation
- a. The 1991 and 1998 Cooperation Agreements
- b. The Application of the Agreements
- c. Merger Best Practices
- d. Joint Technology Competition Policy Dialogue
- (ii) Other Dedicated Bilateral Competition Cooperation Agreements
- (iii) Other Bilateral Cooperation Arrangements
- (i) EU-US Cooperation
- C. Multilateral Cooperation
- (i) General
- (ii) UNCTAD
- (iii) OECD
- (iv) The WTO
- (v) The International Competition Network
- 1 Introduction to Competition Law
- 5 Article 101 TFEU: Substantive Appraisal
- 9 Horizontal Agreements—Cartels and Collusion
- 11 Vertical Agreements
- 15 Mergers
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Þú getur flakkað milli síðna og kafla eins og þér hentar best og farið beint í ákveðna kafla úr efnisyfirlitinu. Í leitinni finnur þú orð, kafla eða síður í einum smelli.
Glósur og yfirstrikanir
Þú getur auðkennt textabrot með mismunandi litum og skrifað glósur að vild í rafbókina. Þú getur jafnvel séð glósur og yfirstrikanir hjá bekkjarsystkinum og kennara ef þeir leyfa það. Allt á einum stað.
Hvað viltu sjá? / Þú ræður hvernig síðan lítur út
Þú lagar síðuna að þínum þörfum. Stækkaðu eða minnkaðu myndir og texta með multi-level zoom til að sjá síðuna eins og þér hentar best í þínu námi.
Fleiri góðir kostir
- Þú getur prentað síður úr bókinni (innan þeirra marka sem útgefandinn setur)
- Möguleiki á tengingu við annað stafrænt og gagnvirkt efni, svo sem myndbönd eða spurningar úr efninu
- Auðvelt að afrita og líma efni/texta fyrir t.d. heimaverkefni eða ritgerðir
- Styður tækni sem hjálpar nemendum með sjón- eða heyrnarskerðingu
- Gerð : 208
- Höfundur : 19213
- Útgáfuár : 2023
- Leyfi : 380
